Persuasion on Networks

Konstantin Sonin and Georgy Egorov

No 13723, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We analyze persuasion in a model, in which each receiver might buy a direct access to the sender's signal or to rely on her network connections to get it. For the sender, a higher slant increases the impact per direct receiver, yet diminishes the willingness of agents to receive information. Contrary to naive intuition, the optimal propaganda might target peripheral, rather than centrally-located agents, and is at its maximum levels when the probability that information flows between agents is close to zero or nearly one, but not in-between. The impact of the network density depends on this probability as well.

Keywords: Propaganda; Networks; Bayesian persuasion; Percolation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 L82 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Persuasion on Networks (2020)
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