Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy

Jean-Robert Tyran, Rupert Sausgruber and Axel Sonntag

No 13773, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a “dividend of democracy†in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.

Keywords: Redistribution; Disincentive effect; Voting; Legitimacy; Real effort task; Lab experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D31 D72 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13773 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Disincentives from redistribution: evidence on a dividend of democracy (2021)
Working Paper: Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13773

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13773

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().