Motivational Goal Bracketing: An Experiment

Julia Nafziger and Alexander Koch

No 13806, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study theoretically and experimentally how the bracketing of non-binding goals in a repeated task affects the level of goals that people set for themselves, the actual effort provided, and the pattern of effort over time. In our model, a sophisticated or (partially) naive individual faces a motivational problem because of present-biased preferences. Using an online, real-effort experiment that varied whether subjects set separate daily goals for how much to work over a one-week period or one weekly goal, we find support for the theoretical predictions. Subjects with daily goals set higher goals in aggregate and provided more effort than those with a weekly goal. The higher effort was driven by the higher goals set. Additional treatments complemented internal commitment through goals with an externally enforced minimum work requirement to get started working each day. Here, average performance dropped because of high dropout.

Keywords: Self-control; Goals; Narrow bracketing; Commitment; Real effort; Online experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D81 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Motivational goal bracketing: An experiment (2020)
Working Paper: Motivational Goal Bracketing: An Experiment (2017)
Working Paper: Motivational Goal Bracketing: An Experiment (2017)
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