How Effective Are Monetary Incentives to Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Policy

León-Ciliotta, Gianmarco, Luis Martinez () and Mariella Gonzales
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Gianmarco León-Ciliotta ()

No 13898, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We combine two natural experiments, multiple empirical strategies and administrative data to study voters' response to marginal changes to the fi ne for electoral abstention in Peru. A smaller fi ne leads to a robust decrease in voter turnout. However, the drop in turnout caused by a full fi ne reduction is less than 20% the size of that caused by an exemption from compulsory voting, indicating the predominance of the non-monetary incentives provided by the mandate to vote. Additionally, almost 90% of the votes generated by a marginally larger fi ne are blank or invalid, lending support to the hypothesis of rational abstention. Higher demand for information and larger long-run eff ects following an adjustment to the value of the fine point to the existence of informational frictions that limit adaptation to institutional changes.

Keywords: Voter turnout; Voter registration; Compulsory voting; Informational frictions; External validity; Peru (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D83 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How Effective Are Monetary Incentives to Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Policy (2022)
Working Paper: How Effective Are Monetary Incentives to Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Policy (2019)
Working Paper: How effective are monetary incentives to vote? Evidence from a nationwide policy (2019)
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