Patronage for Productivity: Selection and Performance in the Age of Sail
Hans-Joachim Voth and
Guo Xu
No 13963, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
Patronage is a byword for poor performance, yet it remains pervasive. We study the selection effects of patronage in the world’s most successful navy – the British Royal Navy between 1690 and 1849. Using newly collected data on the battle performance of more than 5,800 naval officers promoted – with and without family ties – to the top of the navy hierarchy, we find that connected promotees outperformed unconnected ones. Therewas substantial heterogeneity among the admirals in charge of promotions. Discretion over appointments thus created scope for †good†and †bad†patronage. Because most admirals promoted on the basis of merit and did not favor their kin, the overall selection effect of patronage was positive.
Keywords: Patronage; Management; Performance; Selection; Royal navy; Motivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eff
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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