Bargaining Failure and Freedom to Operate: Re-evaluating the Effect of Patents on Cumulative Innovation

Dietmar Harhoff (), Fabian Gaessler and Stefan Sorg

No 13969, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We investigate the causal effect of patent rights on cumulative innovation, using large-scale data that approximate the patent universe in its technological and economic variety. We introduce a novel instrumental variable for patent invalidation that exploits personnel scarcity in post-grant opposition at the European Patent Ofï¬ ce. We ï¬ nd that patent invalidation leads to a highly signiï¬ cant and sizeable increase of follow-on inventions. The effect is driven by cases where the removal of the individual exclusion right creates substantial freedom to operate for third parties. Importantly, our results suggest that bargaining failure between original and follow-on innovators is not limited to environments commonly associated with high transaction costs

Keywords: Patents; Cumulative innovation; Bargaining failure; Opposition; Freedom to operate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K41 L24 O31 O32 O33 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-law and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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