Imposing Equilibrium Restrictions in the Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games

Victor Aguirregabiria () and Mathieu Marcoux

No 14007, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Imposing equilibrium restrictions provides substantial gains in the estimation of dynamic discrete games. Estimation algorithms imposing these restrictions -- MPEC, NFXP, NPL, and variations -- have different merits and limitations. MPEC guarantees local convergence, but requires the computation of high-dimensional Jacobians. The NPL algorithm avoids the computation of these matrices, but -- in games -- may fail to converge to the consistent NPL estimator. We study the asymptotic properties of the NPL algorithm treating the iterative procedure as performed in finite samples. We find that there are always samples for which the algorithm fails to converge, and this introduces a selection bias. We also propose a spectral algorithm to compute the NPL estimator. This algorithm satisfies local convergence and avoids the computation of Jacobian matrices. We present simulation evidence illustrating our theoretical results and the good properties of the spectral algorithm.

Keywords: Dynamic discrete games; Convergence; Convergence selection bias; Nested pseudo-likelihood; Spectral algorithms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C13 C57 C61 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-gth and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Imposing equilibrium restrictions in the estimation of dynamic discrete games (2021)
Working Paper: Imposing equilibrium restrictions in the estimation of dynamic discrete games (2019)
Working Paper: Imposing Equilibrium Restrictions in the Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games (2019)
Working Paper: Imposing equilibrium restrictions in the estimation of dynamic discrete games (2019)
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