Procuring Medical Devices: Evidence from Italian Public Tenders

Francesco Decarolis and Vincenzo Atella

No 14044, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The public procurement of medical devices is increasingly relying on auction mechanisms to move toward more transparent procedures and to promote competition between suppliers in a market where the quality of the products matters enormously and an improper auction design could be very harmful. Based on Italian hospital data, we present new evidence on the performance of the public tenders to procure orthopaedic prosthesis for hips, knees and shoulders. Focusing on three main outcomes, the number of participants, the presence of a single firm bidding and the winning rebate, for the first time we describe how features related to the tender, hospital, region and bidders' competition all contribute to explain the functioning of the procurement auctions. The evidence we obtain can meaningfully help policy makers in designing and implementing better public procurement systems.

Keywords: Procurement auctions; Medical devices; Orthopaedic prosthesis; Tender characteristics; Italy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 I18 J18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-eur
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Procuring medical devices: evidence from Italian public tenders (2024)
Working Paper: Procuring Medical Devices: Evidence from Italian Public Tenders (2019)
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