Positive Spillovers from Negative Campaigning

Salvatore Nunnari, Vincenzo Galasso and Tommaso Nannicini

No 14312, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Negative advertising is frequent in electoral campaigns, despite its ambiguous effectiveness: negativity may reduce voters' evaluation of the targeted politician but have a backlash effect for the attacker. We study the effect of negative advertising in electoral races with more than two candidates with a large scale field experiment during an electoral campaign for mayor in Italy and a survey experiment in a fictitious mayoral campaign. In our field experiment, we find a strong, positive spillover effect on the third main candidate (neither the target nor the attacker). This effect is confirmed in our survey experiment, which creates a controlled environment with no ideological components nor strategic voting. The negative ad has no impact on the targeted incumbent, has a sizable backlash effect on the attacker, and largely benefits the idle candidate. The attacker is perceived as less cooperative, less likely to lead a successful government, and more ideologically extreme.

Keywords: Electoral campaign; Political advertisement; Randomized controlled trial; Field experiment; Survey experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D72 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Positive Spillovers from Negative Campaigning (2020)
Working Paper: Positive Spillovers from Negative Campaigning (2020)
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