Are Executives in Short Supply? Evidence from Deaths' Events

Fabiano Schivardi and Julien Sauvagnat

No 14334, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Using exhaustive administrative data on Italian social security records, we construct measures of local labor market tightness for executives that vary by industry and location. We then show that firm performance is negatively affected by executives death, but only in thin local labor markets. Death events are followed by an increase in the separation rate for the other executives of the firm, in particular for those with a college degree. Consistent with the hypothesis that the drop in performance is due to the fact that executives are in short supply, we find that after a death event executives wages in other firms increase, but only in thin markets. This indicates that local policies aiming at boosting the supply of managerial skills might be effective at increasing firm performance.

Keywords: Executives supply; Firm performance; Local growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 M51 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Are Executives in Short Supply? Evidence from Death Events (2024)
Working Paper: Are Executives in Short Supply? Evidence from Deaths' Events (2020)
Working Paper: Are Executives in Short Supply? Evidence from Deaths' Events (2020)
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