The Political Economy of Status Competition: Sumptuary Laws in Preindustrial Europe

Mark Koyama and Desiree Desierto

No 14407, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Sumptuary laws that regulated clothing based on social status were an important part of the political economy of premodern states. We introduce a model that rationalizes the use of sumptuary laws by elites to regulate status competition from below. Our model predicts a non-monotonic effect of income – sumptuary legislation initially increases with income, but then falls as income increases further. The initial rise is more likely for states with less extractive institutions, whose ruling elites face greater status threat from the rising commercial class. We test these predictions using a newly collected dataset of country and city-level sumptuary laws.

Keywords: Status competition; Regulation; Rent-seeking; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 K42 N4 N43 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: The Political Economy of Status Competition: Sumptuary Laws in Preindustrial Europe (2024)
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