Encouraging Others: Punishment and Performance in the Royal Navy

Hans-Joachim Voth and Guo Xu

No 14476, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Can severe penalties †encourage the others†? Using the famous case of the British Admiral John Byng, executed for his failure to recapture French-held Menorca in 1757, we examine the incentive effects of judicial punishments. Men related to Byng performed markedly better after his unexpected death. We generalize this result using information from 963 court martials. Battle performance of captains related to a courtmartialed and convicted officer improved sharply thereafter. The loss of influential connections was key for incentive effects – officers with other important connections improved little after Byng’s execution or other severe sentences.

Keywords: Principal agent problems; Punishment; Labor incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 J20 N33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-hrm and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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