Pareto-improving transition to fully funded pensions under myopia

Torben M Andersen, Joydeep Bhattacharya and Marias H Gestsson

No 14650, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Under dynamic efficiency, a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme helps the current generation of retirees but hurts future generations because they are forced to save via a return-dominated scheme. Abandoning it is deemed welfare-improving but typically not for all generations. But what if agents are present-biased (hence, undersave for retirement) and the "paternalistically motivated forced savings" component of a PAYG scheme motivated its existence in the first place? This paper shows it is possible to transition from such a PAYG scheme on to a higher return, mandated fully-funded scheme; yet, no generation is hurt in the process. The results inform the debate on policy design of pension systems as more and more policy makers push for the transition to take place but are forced to recognize that current retirees may get hurt along the way.

Keywords: Present-biased preferences; Mandatory pensions; Transition; Pareto criterion pension crowding out (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D3 D91 E6 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-dge and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Pareto-improving transition to fully funded pensions under myopia (2021)
Journal Article: Pareto-improving transition to fully funded pensions under myopia (2021)
Working Paper: Pareto-improving transition to fully funded pensions under myopia (2021)
Working Paper: Pareto-improving transition to fully funded pensions under myopia (2018)
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