Recruitment Policies, Job-Filling Rates and Matching Efficiency

Carlos Carrillo-Tudela, Hermann Gartner and Leo Kaas

No 14727, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Recruitment behavior is important for the matching process in the labor market. Using unique linked survey-administrative data, we explore the relationships between hiring and recruitment policies. Faster hiring goes along with higher search effort, lower hiring standards and more generous wages. To analyze the mechanisms behind these patterns, we develop a directed search model in which firms use different recruitment margins in response to productivity shocks. The calibrated model points to an important role of hiring standards for matching efficiency and for the impact of labor market policy, whereas search effort and wage policies play only a minor role.

Keywords: Vacancies; Recruitment; Labor market matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J23 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-lma and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP14727 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Recruitment Policies, Job-Filling Rates, and Matching Efficiency (2023)
Working Paper: Recruitment Policies, Job-Filling Rates and Matching Efficiency (2020)
Working Paper: Recruitment Policies, Job-Filling Rates and Matching Efficiency (2020)
Working Paper: Recruitment Policies, Job-Filling Rates and Matching Efficiency (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14727

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP14727

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().