Comparative Politics with Intraparty Candidate Selection

Nicolas Sahuguet

No 14763, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We develop a two-stage model in which parties select candidates before the election. Elections are under first-past-the-post (FPTP) or closed-list proportional representation (PR). Selection is competitive or non-competitive. With non-competitive selection, candidate effort is higher under FPTP. With competitive selection, effort is higher under PR. Under PR, competition motivates candidates to exert effort to be selected (as under FPTP) and to be ranked higher on the list. Empirical studies comparing electoral rules should consider how parties organize, to avoid omitted variable bias. The results also suggest that electoral rules influence how parties organize.

Keywords: Comparative politics; Electoral rule; Contests; Candidate selection; Party lists. proportional representation; Party organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Comparative politics with intraparty candidate selection (2023)
Working Paper: Comparative Politics with Intraparty Candidate Selection (2022)
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