Immigration, Occupational Choice and Electoral Rules Theory and Evidence on Dual Ballot Openness
Massimo Morelli (),
Matteo Gamalerio and
Margherita Negri
No 14896, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
Do institutions affect the level of openness of immigration policies? We study theoretically and empirically how different electoral systems affect the reception of refugees, comparing Single Round Plurality with Dual Ballot systems. We focus on mayoral elections at the municipality level. Our model predicts that municipalities that elect the mayor with a Dual Ballot system receive more refugee- related fiscal transfers from the central government and are more likely to host refugees, compared to municipalities that use a Single Round Plurality system. Using data from Italian municipalities and regression discontinuity design, we provide empirical evidence that confirms the predictions of the theoretical model.
Keywords: Electoral rules; Immigration; Occupational choice; Sprar (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J24 J61 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mig, nep-ore and nep-pol
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