Evading Corporate Responsibilities: Evidence from the Shipping Industry

Guillaume Vuillemey

No 15291, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: I show that the maritime shipping industry - handling above 80% of global trade flows - has evolved over the past decades to systematically evade "corporate responsibilities," i.e., compliance with regulatory standards and potential tort liabilities. Shipping firms increasingly dissociated legal and ultimate ownership, fragmented assets in one-ship subsidiaries, used flags of convenience, and evaded end-of-life responsibilities with "last-voyage flags." Microeconomic tests confirm that responsibility evasion, amidst global competition, is a dominant motive behind these patterns. These findings have implications for our understanding of corporate social responsibility, of extended forms of liability, and of the "dark side" of globalization.

Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; Shipping; Flags of convenience; Limited liability; Subsidiary; Globalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-law
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