The Political Economics of Non-democracy

Konstantin Sonin and Georgy Egorov

No 15344, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We survey recent theoretical and empirical literature on political economy of non-democracies. Dictators face many challenges to their rule: internal, such as palace coups or breakdown of their support coalition, or external, such as mass protests or revolutions. We analyze strategic decisions made by dictators --- hiring political loyalists to positions that require competence, restricting media freedom at the cost of sacrificing bureaucratic efficiency, running a propaganda campaign, organizing electoral fraud, purging associates and opponents, and repressing citizens --- as driven by the desire to maximize the regime's chances of staying in power. We argue that the key to understanding the functioning and ultimately the fate of a nondemocratic regime is the information flows within the regime, and the institutions that govern these information flows.

Keywords: Nondemocratic politics; Dictatorship; Bureaucracy; Electoral fraud; Revolutions; Coup d'etat; Media freedom; Propaganda; Censorship; Repressions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 D74 D82 D83 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Political Economics of Non-democracy (2024)
Working Paper: The Political Economics of Non-democracy (2020)
Working Paper: The Political Economics of Non-democracy (2020)
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