Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote

Felix Bierbrauer and Mattias K Polborn

No 15401, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Gerrymandering undermines representative democracy by creating many uncompetitive legislative districts, and generating the very real possibility that a party that wins a clear majority of the popular vote does not win a majority of districts. We present a new approach to the determination of electoral districts, taking a design perspective. Specifically, we develop a redistricting game between two parties who both seek an advantage in upcoming elections, and show that we can achieve two desirable properties: First, the overall election outcome corresponds to the popular vote. Second, most districts are competitive.

Keywords: Gerrymandering; Legislative elections; Redistricting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competitive gerrymandering and the popular vote (2020)
Working Paper: Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote (2020)
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