Self-Signaling in Moral Voting

Jean-Robert Tyran, Lydia Mechtenberg, Grischa Perino, Nicolas Treich and Stephanie Wang

No 15645, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper presents a two-wave survey experiment on self-image concerns in moral voting. We elicit votes on the so-called Horncow Initiative. This initiative required subsidization of farmers who refrain from dehorning. We investigate how non-consequentialist and non-deontological messages changing the moral self-signaling value of a Yes vote affect selection and processing of consequentialist information, and reported voting behavior. We find that a message enhancing the self-signaling value of a Yes vote is effective: voters agree more with arguments in favor of the initiative, anticipate more frequently voting in favor, and report more frequently having voted in favor of the initiative.

Keywords: Moral bias; Voting; Multi-wave field experiment; Information avoidance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D72 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15645 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Self-Signaling in Moral Voting (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15645

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15645

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().