'Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families

Rossella Calvi and Ajinkya Keskar

No 15696, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We develop a non-cooperative bargaining model with incomplete information linking dowry payments, domestic violence, resource allocation between a husband and a wife, and separation. Our model generates several predictions, which we test empirically using amendments to the Indian anti-dowry law as a natural experiment. We document a decline in women's decision-making power and separations, and a surge in domestic violence following the amendments. These unintended effects are attenuated when social stigma against separation is low and, in some circumstances, when gains from marriage are high. Whenever possible, parents increase investment in their daughters’ human capital to compensate for lower dowries.

Keywords: Domestic violence; Dowry; Non-cooperative bargaining; India; Marital surplus; Women's empowerment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 I31 J12 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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