Local Evidence and Diversity in Minipublics

Nina Bobkova and Arjada Bardhi

No 15704, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study optimal minipublic design with endogenous evidence. A policymaker selects a group of citizens—a minipublic—for advice on the desirability of a policy. Citizens can discover local evidence but might be deterred by uncertainty about the policymaker’s adoption standard. We show that such uncertainty can be detrimental to evidence discovery even with costless evidence, civic-minded citizens, and ex ante aligned players. Evidence discovery is hardest to sustain under moderate uncertainty. The optimal minipublic has low diversity: it overrepresents citizens around the median citizen and underrepresents those at the margins. Our findings bear implications for the French Citizens’ Convention on Climate.

Keywords: Minipublic; Evidence discovery; Political uncertainty; Informational diversity; Demographic diversity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Local Evidence and Diversity in Minipublics (2023)
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