Economic and Institutional Consequences of Populism
Antonio Spilimbergo and
Nicolas Magud
No 15824, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We analyze the institutional and economic consequences of populism in Latin America in the last 50 years. Populist regimes weaken institutions and macroeconomic (fiscal, monetary, and external) indicators, resulting in crises and worse income distribution. The duration of populist regimes depends on favorable external conditions. In particular, the commodity super-cycle of the 2000s and easy financing conditions allowed populists to stay in power longer than in past episodes.
Keywords: Political economy; Populism; Latin america; Institutions; Commodity supercycle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-his, nep-mac and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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