Trainspotting: Board Appointments in Private Firms

Audinga Baltrunaite and Egle Karmaziene

No 15828, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper examines how the size of the corporate directors’ labor market affects board appointments in Italian private limited liability firms. As an exogenous shock to a firm’s access to potential non-local directors, we exploit the gradual expansion of the high-speed railway network that improves intercity mobility. We find that the non-local supply of directors increases the positive assortative matching between directors and firms: high-quality firms improve the quality of their boards, while low-quality firms reduce it. We also show that director quality is positively associated with firm growth and productivity, and negatively associated with the probability of default.

Keywords: Director supply; Board of directors; Match quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Trainspotting: Board Appointments in Private Firms (2020)
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