Optimal Sequential Contests

Toomas Hinnosaar

No 15855, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has a range of applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an earlier-mover advantage. Finally, I derive the limits for large contests.

Keywords: Contest design; Oligopoly; Public goods; Rent-seeking; R&d (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D72 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Journal Article: Optimal sequential contests (2024)
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