Trade Standards and the Political Economy of Genetically Modified Food

Kym Anderson, Richard Damania and Lee Ann Jackson

No 4526, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: A common-agency lobbying model is developed to help understand why North America and the European Union have adopted such different policies towards genetically modified food. Our results show that when firms (in this case farmers) lobby policy-makers to influence standards and consumers and environmentalists care about the choice of standard, it is possible that increased competition from abroad can lead to strategic incentives to raise standards, not just lower them as shown in earlier models. This theoretical proposition is supported by numerical results from a global general equilibrium model of GM adoption in America without and with an EU moratorium.

Keywords: Gmos; Political economy; Regulation of standards; Trade policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 O33 O38 Q17 Q18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Working Paper: Trade, Standards, and the Political Economy of Genetically Modified Food (2004)
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