Democracy, Property Rights, Redistribution and Economic Growth

Mark Gradstein ()

No 5130, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Protection of property rights, as well as the burden of fiscal redistribution, have long been viewed as growth related factors. It is argued here that democratization may affect both. As the economy becomes more democratic, it creates high quality institutions such as public protection of property rights, but also becomes more responsive to fiscal demands. The analysis ? which, we argue, is consistent with existing evidence - reveals that the net effect is likely to increase growth while at the same time reducing inequality. We also introduce the concept of a political bias and argue that its gradual reduction is the means to indirectly commit to high quality institutions. All this indicates, in particular, a strong link between democracy and institutional quality.

Keywords: Democracy; Growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O11 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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