Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States

Timothy Besley, Torsten Persson () and Daniel Sturm

No 5138, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: One of the most cherished propositions in economics is that market competition by and large raises consumer welfare. But whether political competition has similarly virtuous consequences is far less discussed. This paper formulates a model to explain why political competition may enhance economic performance and uses the United States as a testing ground for the model's implications. It finds statistically robust evidence that political competition has quantitatively important effects on state income growth, state policies, and the quality of Governors.

Keywords: Economic growth; Political competition; U.s. south; voting restrictions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 H70 N12 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States (2006)
Working Paper: Political competition and economic performance: theory and evidence from the United States (2005)
Working Paper: Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States (2005)
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