Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements

Kamal Saggi and Limão, Nuno
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Nuno M. Limão

No 5560, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. We show that monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties when there are violations in equilibrium. However, fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of retaliatory tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the current system. We also consider the use of bonds as a means of settling disputes. If bonds can be posted with a third party, they do not have to be supported by retaliatory tariffs and can improve the negotiating position of countries that are too small to threaten tariff retaliation.

Keywords: Dispute settlement; Wto; Tariffs; Monetary fines; Bonds; Concessions; Reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk and nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Chapter: Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements (2018)
Chapter: Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements (2018)
Journal Article: Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements (2008)
Working Paper: Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements (2006)
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