Screening Disability Insurance Applications

Maarten Lindeboom (), Bas van der Klaauw and Philip de Jong

No 5564, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.

Keywords: Sickness absenteeism; Policy evaluation; Disability insurance; Self-screening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J28 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: SCREENING DISABILITY INSURANCE APPLICATIONS (2011)
Working Paper: Screening disability insurance applications (2006)
Working Paper: Screening Disability Insurance Applications (2006)
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