Last Minute Feedback

Konrad Stahl, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Tobias Klein and Christian Lambertz

No 5693, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Feedback mechanisms that allow partners to rate each other after a transaction are considered crucial for the success of anonymous internet trading platforms. We document an asymmetry in the feedback behaviour on eBay, propose an explanation based on the micro structure of the feedback mechanism and the time when feedbacks are given, and support this explanation by findings from a large data set. Our analysis implies that the informational content of feedback records is likely to below. The reason for this is that agents appear to leave feedbacks strategically. Negative feedbacks are given late, in the "last minute", or not given at all, because of the fear of retaliative negative feedback. Conversely, positive feedbacks are given early in order to encourage reciprocation. Towards refining our insights into the observed pattern, we look separately at buyers and sellers, and relate the magnitude of the effects to the trading partners' experience.

Keywords: Ebay; Reputation mechanism; Strategic feedback behaviour; Informational content; Reciprocity; Fear of retaliation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L15 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-knm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Working Paper: Last minute feedback (2006)
Working Paper: Last Minute Feedback (2006)
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