Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation

Mark Schankerman and Michael Noel

No 5701, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating, especially in industries characterised by cumulative innovation. This paper studies the effects of strategic patenting on R&D, patenting and market value in the computer software industry. We focus on two key aspects: patent portfolio size which affects bargaining power in patent disputes, and the fragmentation of patent rights ('patent thickets') which increases the transaction costs of enforcement. We develop a model that incorporates both effects, together with R&D spillovers. Using panel data for the period 1980-99, we find evidence that both strategic patenting and R&D spillovers strongly affect innovation and market value of software firms.

Keywords: Patents; Anti-commons; Patent thickets; R&d spillovers; Market value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L43 L86 O31 O33 O34 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse and nep-ino
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation (2013)
Working Paper: Strategic patenting and software innovation (2013)
Working Paper: Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation (2006)
Working Paper: Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation (2006)
Working Paper: Strategic patenting and software innovation (2006)
Working Paper: Strategic patenting and software innovation (2006)
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