Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements?

Carlo Perroni and Paola Conconi

No 5762, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self-sustaining. We show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation; rather, efficient polices may be most easily sustained when countries are unable to pre-commit to policy domestically. Moreover, lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger are the international spillovers of domestic policies.

Keywords: International agreements; Domestic policy commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F02 F10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements? (2009)
Working Paper: Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements? (2009)
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