Exclusive Quality - Why Exclusive Distribution May Benefit the TV Viewers

Johan Stennek

No 6072, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Sports organizations, Hollywood studios and TV channels grant satellite and cable networks exclusive rights to televise their matches, movies and media contents. Exclusive distribution prevents viewers from watching attractive programs, and reduces the TV-distributors incentives to compete in prices. This paper demonstrates that exclusive distribution may also give providers of contents incentives to invest in higher quality and, as a result, force competitors to reduce their prices. Exclusive distribution may benefit all viewers, including those who are excluded.

Keywords: Advertising; Bargaining; Exclusive contracts; investment; Quality; Two-sided market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D43 K21 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cul, nep-law, nep-mic, nep-mkt, nep-net and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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