Harnessing Success: Determinants of University Technology Licensing Performance

Mark Schankerman and Sharon Belenzon

No 6120, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the impact of incentive pay, local development objectives and government constraints on university licensing performance. We develop and test a simple contracting model of technology licensing offices, using new survey information together with panel data on U.S. universities for 1995-99. We find that private universities are much more likely to adopt incentive pay than public ones, but ownership does not affect licensing performance conditional on the use of incentive pay. Adopting incentive pay is associated with about 30-40 percent more income per license. Universities with strong local development objectives generate about 30 percent less income per license, but are more likely to license to local (in-state) startup companies. Stronger government constraints are ?costly? in terms of foregone license income and startup activity. These results are robust to controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity.

Keywords: Incentives; Performance pay; Universities; Technology transfer; Licensing; Local development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 O31 O32 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-sog
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Harnessing Success: Determinants of UniversityTechnology Licensing Performance (2007)
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