Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries

Rohini Pande

No 6273, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Building on the large and growing empirical literature on the political behaviour of individuals in low income countries this chapter seeks to understand corruption through the lens of political economy -- particularly in terms of the political and economic differences between rich and poor countries. Our focus is on the political behaviour of individuals exposed to democratic political institutions. We review the existing literature on the determinants of individual political behaviour to ask whether we can understand the choice of political actors to be corrupt and, importantly, of other individuals to permit it, as a rational response to the social or the economic environment they inhabit. We also discuss the implications of this view of corruption for anti-corruption policies.

Keywords: Corruption; Development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-pol, nep-reg and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Related works:
Chapter: Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries (2008)
Working Paper: Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries (2007)
Working Paper: Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries (2007)
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