Footloose Monopolies: Regulating a "National Champion"

Carlo Scarpa and Giacomo Calzolari ()

No 6413, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We analyze the design of optimal regulation of a domestic monopolist that also competes in an unregulated foreign market. We show how foreign activities by the regulated firm affect domestic regulation, consumers? surplus and firm?s profits. Although expansion in unregulated foreign markets amplifies the regulatory distortions that are caused by the regulator?s limited information, we also show that allowing the firm to compete abroad does not necessarily harm domestic consumers and we analyze if and when the firm?s decision to expand abroad does in fact coincide with consumers? interests in the regulated market.

Keywords: Regulation; Foreign competition; National champions; Multinational enterprises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Footloose Monopolies: Regulating a “National Champion” (2009)
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