Escaping Epidemics Through Migration? Quarantine Measures Under Asymmetric Information About Infection Risk

Paul Seabright and Alice Mesnard

No 6653, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper explores implications of the fact that individuals know more than the authorities about their risk of infection and can take migration decisions before their health status is publicly observable. In a 2-period model we study under which conditions the presence of quarantine measures may lead to inefficient outcomes as individuals' interest in migration to escape centres of disease may become stronger and generate negative externalities imposed on other uninfected individuals.

Keywords: Epidemic diseases; Migration; Public policy; Quarantine (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 O15 O19 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-mig
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Working Paper: Escaping Epidemics Through Migration? Quarantine Measures under Asymmetric Information about Infection Risk (2008)
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