Forced Saving, Redistribution and Nonlinear Social Security Schemes

Pierre Pestieau, Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder and Darío Maldonado

No 6775, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper studies the design of a nonlinear social security scheme in a society where individuals differ in two respects: productivity and degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save 'enough' for their retirement because their 'myopic self' emerges when labor supply and savings decisions are made. The social welfare function is paternalistic: the rate of time preference of the far-sighted (which corresponds to the 'true' preferences of the myopics) is used for both types. We show that the paternalistic solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics. This is because paternalistic considerations are mitigated or even outweighed by incentive effects. Our numerical results suggest that as the number of myopic individuals increases, there is less redistribution and more forced saving. Furthermore, as the number of myopic increases, the desirability of social security (measured by the difference between social welfare with and without social security) increases.

Keywords: Dual self; Myopia; Paternalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Forced Saving, Redistribution, and Nonlinear Social Security Schemes (2009)
Working Paper: Forced saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes (2009)
Working Paper: Forced saving, redistribution and non linear social security scheme (2009)
Working Paper: Forced saving, redistribution and non linear social security scheme (2009)
Working Paper: Forced Saving, Redistribution and Nonlinear Social Security Schemes (2008)
Working Paper: Forced saving, redistribution and nonlinear social security schemes (2008)
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