A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions

Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales

No 7298, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We design a new, implementable capital requirement for large financial institutions (LFIs) that are too big to fail. Our mechanism mimics the operation of margin accounts. To ensure that LFIs do not default on either their deposits or their derivative contracts, we require that they maintain a capital cushion sufficiently great that their own credit default swap price stays below a threshold level. If this level is violated the LFI regulator forces the LFI to issue equity until the CDS price moves back below the threshold. If this does not happen within a predetermined period of time, the regulator intervenes. We show that this mechanism ensures that LFIs are solvent with probability one, while preserving the disciplinary effects of debt.

Keywords: Banks; Capital requirement; Too big to fail (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-bec, nep-reg and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions (2011)
Working Paper: A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions (2009)
Working Paper: A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions (2009)
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