Naked exclusion: Towards a behavioral approach to exclusive dealing

Jan Boone, Müller, Wieland and Sigrid Suetens
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Wieland Müller

No 7303, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We report experimental results on exclusive dealing inspired by the literature on "naked exclusion.'' Our key findings are: First, exclusion of a more efficient entrant is a widespread phenomenon in lab markets. Second, allowing incumbents to discriminate between buyers increases exclusion rates compared to the non-discriminatory case only when payments to buyers can be offered sequentially and secretly. Third, allowing discrimination does not lead to significant decreases in costs of exclusion. Accounting for the observation that buyers are more likely to accept an exclusive deal the higher is the payment, substantially improves the fit between theoretical predictions and observed behavior.

Keywords: Coordination; Entry deterrence; Exclusive dealing; Experiments; Externalities; Foreclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 L12 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP7303 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Naked Exclusion in the Lab: The Case of Sequential Contracting (2014)
Working Paper: Naked Exclusion: Towards a Behavioral Approach to Exclusive Dealing (2009)
Working Paper: Naked Exclusion: Towards a Behavioral Approach to Exclusive Dealing (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7303

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP7303

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().