Higher Vote Thresholds for Incumbents, Effort and Selection

Hans Gersbach

No 7320, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The election mechanism has difficulties in selecting the most able candidates and deselecting less able ones. In a simple model we show that the power of elections as a selection and incentive device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds than 50% for incumbents. A higher vote threshold makes it impossible for office-holders of low ability to pool with more able office-holders in order to be reelected. As a consequence, the average ability of reelected politicians and the average effort level tends to increase. The socially optimal threshold can be set by the public. Alternatively, one could allow candidates to compete with individual vote thresholds.

Keywords: Effort; Elections; Incumbents; Political contracts; Selection; Vote-share thresholds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D82 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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