Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening

Giancarlo Spagnolo and Giacomo Calzolari ()

No 7434, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with one among several agents, moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, and non-contractible dimensions are governed by relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize optimal relational contracts and competitive screening policies which are interdependent. When non-contractible dimensions are important, the principal optimally restricts competitive screening to a subset of 'loyal' agents, giving up performance bonuses and, when such dimensions are crucial, negotiates an indefinitely renewable contract with one agent. To enhance enforcement, explicit contract duration is also reduced. However, these policies facilitate collusion among agents, which induces an additional trade-off between reputational forces and collusion. When non-contractible dimensions are very important this last trade-off may disappear, as collusion allows more efficient enforcement of better performance.

Keywords: Auctions; Collusion; Contract duration; Efficiency wages; Implicit and incomplete contracts; Limited enforcement; Loyalty; Multi-tasking; Negotiation; Non-contractible quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D86 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (62)

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