Political Support and Tax Compliance: A Social Interaction Approach

Chaim Fershtman () and Vilen Lipatov

No 7554, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: People may express their political opinion by adopting different measures of civil disobedience. Tax compliance is an example of an economic decision that may be affected by anti-goverment sentiment. We consider a model in which political opinion as well as tax compliance decisions are both formed as part of a social interaction process in which individuals interact, exchange ideas and observe behavior. Tax compliance is affected by the level of government support and political opinion may be affected by government's auditing policy. The government's role is to set a social spending program which is viewed differently by rich and poor individuals. The paper focuses on the interdependence between tax compliance, government's social policies and political support, embedding this interdependence in a dynamic social interaction process.

Keywords: Political opinion; Social interaction; Tax evasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 H50 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
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Working Paper: Political Support and Tax Compliance: A Social Interaction Approach (2009)
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