Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe

Daniel Hamermesh and Gerard Pfann

No 7603, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We develop a theory of the market for individual reputation, an indicator of regard by one?s peers and others. The central questions are: 1) Does the quantity of exposures raise reputation independent of their quality? and 2) Assuming that overall quality matters for reputation, does the quality of an individual?s most important exposure have an extra effect on reputation? Using evidence for academic economists, we find that, conditional on its impact, the quantity of output has no or even a negative effect on each of a number of proxies for reputation, and very little evidence that a scholar?s most influential work provides any extra enhancement of reputation. Quality ranking matters more than absolute quality. Data on mobility and salaries show, on the contrary, substantial positive effects of quantity, independent of quality. We test various explanations for the differences between the determinants of reputation and salary.

Keywords: Quality/quantity trade-off; Mobility; Salary determination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sog
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe (2009)
Working Paper: Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe (2009)
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