Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of Violence During the Transition

Uwe Sunde, Piergiuseppe Fortunato () and Matteo Cervellati

No 8315, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of violent civil conflicts during the process of democratization for the quality of emerging democracies, and in particular, the protection of civil (political and economic) liberties. A simple theory in which different groups may engage in violent conflict in order to become the ruler predicts a crucial role of the democratization scenario. A peaceful democratization leads to democracies with a high degree of civil liberties, reflecting a social contract according to which all groups are politically represented and the rulers deliberately abstain from wasteful rent extraction. A transition to democracy under a violent conflict is less likely to lead to a system with a high degree of civil liberties. Empirical evidence from the third wave of democratization based on a difference-in-difference methodology supports the theoretical predictions. The findings suggest that violent conflicts during the democratic transition have persistent negative effects on the quality of the emerging democracies.

Keywords: Civil conflict; Civil liberties; Democratization; Violent democratization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 N10 O20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of Violence During the Transition (2011)
Working Paper: Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of Violence During the Transition (2011)
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