Field Experiments with Firms

Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay () and Imran Rasul

No 8412, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We discuss how the use of field experiments sheds light on long standing research questions relating to firm behavior. We present insights from two classes of experiments: within and across firms, and draw common lessons from both sets. Field experiments within firms generally aim to shed light on the nature of agency problems. Along these lines, we discuss how field experiments have provided new insights on shirking behavior, and the provision of monetary and non-monetary incentives. Field experiments across firms generally aim to uncover firms' binding constraints by exogenously varying the availability of key inputs such as labor, physical capital, and managerial capital. We conclude by discussing some of the practical issues researchers face when designing experiments and by highlighting areas for further research.

Keywords: Field experiments; Firms; Organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hme and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (101)

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Journal Article: Field Experiments with Firms (2011)
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Working Paper: Field Experiments with Firms (2011)
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