Does Europe have an innovation policy? The case of EU economic law

Pierre Larouche, Matteo Negrinotti and Lauren Battaglia

No 8481, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper is the first of a larger project aimed at exploring, among other things, whether Europe has a consistent innovation policy in the context of EU economic law (competition policy, intellectual property law, sector regulation). As such, its primary aim is to present our approach for answering this question and outline the anticipated contributions of the project. Part I of the paper sets forth the theoretical foundations of the project--namely an integrated approach to economic law that moves beyond apparent conflicts and assumes innovation as the starting point. Taking this as the foundation, the two primary components of the project are described. First, a theoretical component involving the development of an analytical grid to be used to identify ways in which economic law impacts innovation, and second an applied component that explores observable instances where choices, both implicit and explicit, are made regarding innovation in economic law. Part II of the paper builds on this and offers a preliminary illustration of the proposed analysis in the context of pharmaceuticals, specifically drug reformulation regulatory gaming.

Keywords: Innovation; Economic law; Antitrust; Pharmaceuticals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 O31 O34 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eec, nep-eur, nep-hme, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-law and nep-reg
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