Competition and Industry Structure for International Rail Transportation

Marc Ivaldi, Guido Friebel () and Jerome Pouyet

No 8491, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper investigates various options for the organization of the railway industry when network operators require the access to multiple national networks to provide international (freight or passenger) transport services. The EU rail system provides a framework for our analysis. Returns-to-scale and the intensity of competition are key to understanding the impact of vertical integration or separation between infrastructure and operation services within each country in the presence of international transport services. We also consider an option in which a transnational infrastructure manager is in charge of offering a coordinated access to the national networks. In our model, it turns out to be an optimal industry structure.

Keywords: Network access; Transport economics; Vertical separation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 L42 L51 L92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse, nep-ind, nep-net and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8491 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Competition and Industry Structure for International Rail Transportation (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8491

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8491

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().