Management practices: Are not for profits different?
Carol Propper,
Sarah Smith,
Robert Dur and
Josse Delfgaauw
No 8498, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of good management for firm performance. Here, we focus on management in not-for-profits (NFPs). We present a model predicting that management quality will be lower in NFPs compared to for-profits (FPs), but that outputs may not be worse if managers are altruistic. Using a tried and tested survey of management practices, we find that NFPs score lower than FPs but also that, while the relationship between management scores and outputs holds for FPs, the same is not true for NFPs. One implication is that management practices that work for FPs may be less effective in driving performance in NFPs.
Keywords: Impure altruism; Management; Not-for-profits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H8 J24 J45 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-hrm
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8498 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
Working Paper: Management practices: Are not-for-profits different? (2011)
Working Paper: Management Practices: Are Not For Profits Different? (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8498
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8498
orders@cepr.org
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (repec@cepr.org).